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1. Introduction  
 
The continued success of the European Economic Area (EEA) greatly depends on the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) extending its interpretations of EU internal market law to situations gov-
erned by the EEA Agreement.1 Ever since the seminal Grand Chamber judgment in Ospelt, the 
Court has done just that, thereby enabling “the fullest possible realisation of the free movement 
of goods, persons, services and capital within the whole EEA, so that the internal market estab-
lished within the European Union is extended to the EFTA States”.2 Within the scope of the 
EEA Agreement, citizens and economic operators from Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway (the 
“EEA EFTA” States) thus enjoy essentially the same rights in the EU as their EU counterparts, 
while the three participating EFTA States find themselves “on the same footing as Member 
States of the European Union” for the purposes of the application of internal market rules.3 
The ability of the ECJ to secure uniform interpretation of corresponding provisions of EU and 
EEA law is tested, however, in cases where the interpretation and/or application of the former 
is influenced by parts of EU law that are not to be found in the EEA Agreement. There are two 
main categories of such cases – the ones where the relevant provisions of EU law are covered 
by (an)other agreement(s) between the EU and the EEA EFTA States, and the ones where they 
are not. Examples of the former category are cases where the interpretation and/or application 
of EEA-relevant EU law is influenced by provisions of EU law that are reproduced in the agree-
ments that link the EEA EFTA States of Iceland, Norway and/or Liechtenstein to the Schengen 
 
* University of Bergen.  ** University of Oslo, NUPI, and SIEPS. I am grateful to Niamh Nic Shuibhne for all 
the helpful discussions. The usual disclaimer applies. 
 
1 OJ No L 1, 3.1.1994, p. 3. For an overview, see H.H. Fredriksen and C. Franklin, ‘Of pragmatism and principles: 
the EEA Agreement 20 years on’, 52 CMLRev. (2015), 629-684. 
2 Case C-452/01, Ospelt, EU:C:2003:493, para. 29. 
3 A stated by the Grand Chamber in Case C-81/13 UK v Council, EU:C:2014:2449, para. 59 (differentiating the 




area,4 the EU’s common asylum system,5 the EU’s arrest warrant and surrender procedure,6 the 
EU rules on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and com-
mercial matters,7 etc. A hotly debated example from the latter category is the provisions on EU 
citizenship found in Articles 20ff. TFEU, relating in particular to the question of how far the 
lack of an EEA parallel to Article 21 TFEU can be “compensated”8 by a dynamic interpretation 
of the Citizenship Directive (2004/38/EU),9 or “made up for by other provisions of the EEA 
Agreement”.10 
When the Supreme Court of Croatia turned to the ECJ with the question of whether EU law 
offers an Icelandic citizen the same protection from extradition to a third State as the one the 
Court of Justice had granted to EU citizens on the basis of Articles 18 and 21 TFEU in the 
Petruhhin case,11 the stage seemed to be set for a landmark judgment dealing with both catego-
ries of differences between EU and EEA law. However, as we shall see, the Court found a way 
to preserve homogeneity between EU and EEA law without having to deal with the fact that 
the concept of EU citizenship has no equivalent in EEA law, nor in any of the related agree-
ments between the EU and Iceland.  
That said, I.N. is still a landmark judgment. In establishing whether I.N., an Icelandic citizen, 
could be protected in the EU from extradition to Russia, the ECJ construes his free movement 
rights and their protection, in the light of several instruments governing the “special relation-
ship” between Iceland and the Union, which as the Court opines “goes beyond economic and 
 
4 Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of 
Norway concerning the latter’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen 
acquis, (OJ 1999 L 176, p. 36) and Protocol between the European Union, the Swiss Confederation and the Prin-
cipality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the Euro-
pean Union and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, ap-
plication and development of the Schengen acquis (OJ 2011 L 160, p. 3). 
5 Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway con-
cerning the criteria and mechanisms for establishing the state responsible for examining a request for asylum 
lodged in a Member State or in Iceland or Norway (OJ 2001 L 93, p. 40) and Protocol between the European 
Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of 
Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation concerning the 
criteria and mechanisms for establishing the State responsible for examining a request for asylum lodged in a 
Member State or in Switzerland (OJ 2011 L 160, p. 39). 
6 Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway on the surren-
der procedure between the Member States of the European Union and Iceland and Norway (OJ 2014 L 343, p. 1) 
and the Convention of 27 September 1996 relating to Extradition between the Member States of the EU (OJ C 
313, 23.10.1996, p. 12) (applicable to the EFTA States as Associated Schengen countries). 
7 The Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commer-
cial matters (OJ 2007 L 339, p. 3).  
8 As indeed argued by I.N in the case under review, see AG Tanchev’s Opinion of 27 February 2020, 
EU:C:2020:128, para. 38. 
9 As incorporated into the EEA Agreement by EEA Joint Committee Decision No 158/2007 (OJ 2008 L 124, p. 
20, and EEA Supplement 2008 No 26, p. 17). 
10 As contended by the European Commission in the case under review, see AG Tanchev’s Opinion of 27 February 
2020, EU:C:2020:128, para. 70. 
11 Case C-182/15, Petruhhin, EU:C:2016:630. See the annotation by M. Böse, ‘Mutual recognition, extradition to 




commercial cooperation”.12 For the Court, the fact that the Icelandic citizen concerned “has the 
status as a national of an EFTA State, which is a party to the EEA Agreement, but also the fact 
that that State implements and applies the Schengen acquis, renders the situation of that person 
objectively comparable with that of an EU citizen to whom, in accordance with Article 3(2) 
TEU, the Union offers an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in 
which the free movement of persons is ensured”.13 
The Court of Justice thus envisages the “special relationship” between the EU and Iceland (and 
by extension Norway) in a holistic and integrated fashion, and on that basis reinforces the sig-
nificance of the (free movement) rights its nationals enjoy in the EU legal order. By linking 
their situation more closely to that of EU citizens in terms of freedoms of movement, the I.N. 
ruling enriches the current status of Icelandic (and other EEA EFTA states’) citizens in the EU 
legal order, and by extension of EU citizens in Iceland (and other EEA EFTA states). The Court 
thus develops the law of European integration beyond EU membership, which has been made 
more complex after the UK’s withdrawal from the Union.  
2. Factual and legal background 
 
The facts of the case are both straightforward and extraordinary. I.N. is a former Russian official 
who fled Russia after being charged with corruption. According to I.N., the charges were 
brought against him in retaliation after he had revealed the corrupt practices of some of his 
superiors. On that basis, Iceland granted him asylum as a refugee in 2015 and then, four years 
later, Icelandic citizenship. Shortly after obtaining Icelandic citizenship,14 I.N. was arrested by 
the Croatian border police while on holiday with his family. The arrest took place under an 
international wanted persons notice issued by Interpol’s Bureau in Moscow. 
As Russia sought I.N.’s extradition based on the 1957 European Convention on Extradition,15 
Croatian courts were confronted with the question of whether the protection against extradition 
to third countries established by the ECJ’s in Petruhhin applies to citizens of an EEA EFTA 
and/or Schengen Associated State. In that case, the ECJ had held national rules on extradition 
that allows for the extradition of a Union citizen who is a national of another Member State, but 
not the Member States’ own nationals, to give rise to a restriction of freedom of movement, 
within the meaning of Article 21 TFEU. On this basis, the Court inferred that a Member State 
which does not extradite its own nationals to a given third country, cannot extradite a national 
of another Member State either, as long as that other Member State has jurisdiction to prosecute 
that person for offences committed outside its national territory and does request his surrender, 
in accordance with the provisions of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the Euro-
pean arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States. Thus:  
 
12 Para. 44 of the judgment examined in this annotation. The notion of ‘special relationship’ is also mentioned 
twice at para. 50. 
13 Ibid. 
14 In addition to his Russian citizenship. 




when a Member State to which a Union citizen, a national of another Member State, has 
moved receives an extradition request from a third State with which the first Member 
State has concluded an extradition agreement, it must inform the Member State of which 
the citizen in question is a national and, should that Member State so request, surrender 
that citizen to it, in accordance with the provisions of Council Framework Decision … 
on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, 
… provided that that Member State has jurisdiction, pursuant to its national law, to 
prosecute that person for offences committed outside its national territory.  
The Court also established that “where a Member State receives a request from a third State 
seeking the extradition of a national of another Member State, that first Member State must 
verify that the extradition will not prejudice the rights referred to in Article 19 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union”.16 
Focusing on Iceland’s status as a Schengen Associated State, rather than its status as an EEA 
EFTA State, the Supreme Court of Croatia was of the view that I.N. had exercised his right to 
free movement within the Schengen area. Noting the recent entry into force of the Agreement 
between Iceland (and Norway) and the EU on a surrender procedure, and adding that Croatia 
does not extradite its own nationals to Russia, the Supreme Court asked the ECJ whether Article 
18 TFEU was to be interpreted as giving I.N. the same protection against extradition as that 
enjoyed by EU citizens. 
Before the ECJ, it quickly became clear that Iceland’s status as an EEA EFTA State had to be 
taken into consideration. The pleadings of the parties, institutions and most governments who 
submitted written and/or oral observations suggested that the basis for any analogous applica-
tion of Petruhhin was to be sought in the free movement rights of the EEA Agreement, either 
Article 36 EEA (freedom to go to another EEA State in order to receive (tourist) services) or 
the Citizenship Directive, rather than in Iceland’s status as a Schengen Associated State.17 
As to whether the reasoning in Petruhhin could be transferred to EEA law or not, opinions 
differed. I.N. obviously argued for an affirmative answer, whereas the Russian government took 
a different view. Of the three EU Member States who took part in the proceedings, Croatia and 
Greece supported analogous application of Petruhhin in the EEA, whereas Ireland’s interest in 
the case apparently lie elsewhere – namely, as an opportunity to ask the ECJ to re-visit and 
overrule Petruhhin altogether.18  
For the status and future prospects of the EEA project as such, the positions taken respectively 
by the European Commission, the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) and the two EEA EFTA 
States that submitted observations – Iceland and Norway, are of particular importance. Before 
the ECJ, the Commission, the ESA and the Icelandic government all agreed that the reasoning 
in Petruhhin should be extended to the EEA. Particularly noteworthy, given its role as the key 
 
16 See the operative part of Case C-182/15, Petruhhin, EU:C:2016:630. 
17 See the commendable informative summary of the written and oral observations in AG Tanchev’s Opinion of 
27 February 2020, EU:C:2020:128, paras. 34-77. 
18 The Petruhhin case law indeed continues to be disputed as apparent again in Opinion of AG Hogan in Case C-




EU institution in the everyday life of the EEA Agreement, was the Commission’s insistence 
that even though certain pieces of the Petruhhin puzzle were missing, these could be made up 
for by other provisions of EEA law. Highlighting the object and purpose of the EEA Agreement; 
the ‘privileged relationship’ between the EU, the Member States and the EEA EFTA States; the 
EFTA Court’s expansive interpretation of the Citizenship Directive in Gunnarsson19 and 
Jabbi20 and the EU-Norway/Iceland Surrender Procedure Agreement as an instrument that is 
“equivalent” to the EU Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between EU Member States, the Commission concluded that Petruhhin should be 
extended to the EEA.  
In striking contrast, the observations of the government of Norway were far more reserved. At 
the hearing, Norway highlighted that there is no provision in the EEA Agreement equivalent to 
Article 21 TFEU and argued that it was solely for the Croatian Supreme Court to decide if I.N. 
was a recipient of services under Article 36 EEA. The Norwegian government also took the 
view that the Citizenship Directive was of no relevance to the case, as it does not regulate ex-
tradition requests and criminal law falls outside the scope of the EEA Agreement altogether.  
Norway further contended that the EU-Iceland/Norway Surrender Procedure Agreement is “a 
regular international treaty” that forms no part of EEA law, and which cannot be interpreted in 
the same way as the EU Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between EU Member States. Even if the wording is similar, the context and objec-
tive is different. It was suggested that the Surrender Procedure Agreement lacks both the mutual 
trust objective of the EU Framework Decision and the overarching objective of an area of free-
dom, security and justice without internal frontiers stated in Article 3(2) TEU. Whereas Article 
1(2) of the EU Framework Decision refers to “the principle of mutual recognition”, the Surren-
der Procedure Agreement only refers to “mutual confidence” in its preamble. As a result, the 
priority that the ruling in Petruhhin gives to a request based on the EU Framework Decision 
above any request from a third country, should not be extended to requests based on the Sur-
render Procedure Agreement. Returning to the EEA Agreement, the Norwegian government 
also found it pertinent to state that the obligation to facilitate cooperation enshrined in Article 
3 EEA is less far-reaching than the principle of sincere cooperation of Article 4 TEU.21 
In short, the view of the Norwegian government was that the EEA Agreement should be inter-
preted as not offering an Icelandic (or Norwegian!) citizen the same protection against extradi-
tion from Croatia to Russia as that which EU law offers EU citizens. 
3. The Opinion of the Advocate General  
 
In his Opinion to the Grand Chamber, AG Tanchev highlighted the ‘multi-layered’ complexity 
of the case, and thus indirectly the complexity of the legal relationship between the EU and the 
EEA EFTA States more generally.22 However, the Advocate General quickly identified Article 
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20 Case E-28/15 Jabbi [2016] EFTA Ct. Rep. 575. 
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36 EEA as the proper legal basis to solve the case, noting that the material put before the Court 
at the hearing made clear that I.N. was a recipient of tourist services at the time of his arrest. As 
the ECJ has long acknowledged that Article 36 EEA is to be interpreted in line with what is 
now Article 56 TFEU,23 and as the EFTA Court has affirmed the EEA-relevance of the ECJ’s 
judgment in Cowan,24 the AG concluded without further ado that Article 36 EEA includes the 
freedom for the recipients of services to go to other EEA States in order to receive services 
there, and that tourists are to be regarded as recipients of services.25 Consequently, there was 
no need for AG Tanchev to assess whether the Schengen acquis as such entails a similar right 
to free movement (as apparently suggested by the Croatian Supreme Court in its referral), nor 
whether the Citizenship Directive does so (as argued by I.N., Iceland and the Commission, but 
strongly objected to by Norway).  
The Advocate General then relied on Petruhhin to confirm that a restriction on free movement 
could be justified by the desire to combat the impunity of a person who is present in a territory 
other than that in which he has allegedly committed an offence.26 This led him to the crux of 
the case: namely, whether the use of the Surrender Procedure Agreement that Iceland and Nor-
way have concluded with the EU constitutes an alternative means to prevent impunity which is 
less prejudicial to the exercise of the right to freedom of movement than extradition to a third 
State. Or put differently, whether the ECJ’s assessment of the EU Framework Decision on the 
European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between EU Member States in Petruhhin 
could be extended to the Surrender Procedure Agreement. 
Sharing Norway’s views that “the principle of mutual trust, as it has come to evolve in the 
European Union since the Lisbon Treaty of 2007, has no application in EEA law” and that 
“Article 3(2) TEU has no counterpart in the EEA Agreement’,27 the Advocate General parted 
with the Norwegian government in finding that such differences between EU and EEA law was 
of no relevance to I.N.’s case. He opined that the ruling in Petruhhin should not be understood 
to suggest that recourse to an European Arrest Warrant is the only alternative on which an 
accused can rely when a Member State invokes avoidance of impunity as a justified limitation 
to free movement and, furthermore, that the EU-Iceland/Norway Surrender Procedure Agree-
ment indeed provides an alternative that guarantees against impunity to the same or at least 
similar extent as extradition.28  
Nevertheless, as Iceland had not formally requested the surrender of I.N., the Advocate General 
considered it premature to rule on whether Croatia should send I.N. back to Iceland.29 Instead, 
he turned his attention to the fundamental rights protecting I.N. from exposure to conditions of 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.30 As noted by the Advocate General, I.N. was 
 
23 See, e.g., Case C‑678/11, Commission v Spain, EU:C:2014:2434, para. 66. 
24 Case E‑13/11, Granville, [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 400, para. 37. 
25 Paras. 84 ff. of the Opinion. 
26 Paras. 92 ff. 
27 Para. 97. 
28 Paras. 98 ff. 
29 Para. 122. 




protected from an extradition exposing him to inhuman and degrading treatment by no less than 
three legal instruments – the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights (CFR) and the EEA Agreement. As far as the third of those instruments 
is concerned, the EEA Agreement, AG Tanchev acknowledged that the European Court of Hu-
man Rights recently voiced some scepticism as to the fundamental rights protection offered by 
EEA law,31 but then tacitly distanced himself from that view by highlighting that the EFTA 
Court has long recognised the ECHR as an important source of EEA law, and that this binds 
the EEA States to fundamental rights when they derogate from EEA law.32 Noting that the case-
law of the ECJ makes clear that the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment laid down 
in Article 4 CFR corresponds to that laid down in Article 3 ECHR, AG Tanchev concluded that 
the (thorny) issue of differences in the standard of protection by the three instruments did not 
arise in I.N.’s case. In a noteworthy supplementary remark, he held that Article 6 ECHR too 
protected I.N. against extradition if there was a real risk of him being exposed to a flagrant 
denial of justice in Russian courts, and added that Article 47 of the EU Charter ought to be 
interpreted accordingly.33 
For the Advocate General, the final question was the importance that the Croatian Supreme 
Court had to attach to the fact that Iceland had granted I.N. asylum on the ground that he was 
at risk of suffering inhuman and degrading treatment in Russia. This led to a detailed assessment 
of the agreements that links Iceland, directly and indirectly, to the EU’s common asylum sys-
tem. Highlighting Iceland’s participation in the Dublin III Regulation, the Eurodac Regulation, 
and the European Asylum Support Office, and drawing in Iceland’s status as a Schengen Asso-
ciated State, he opined that Croatia and Iceland are bound to an obligation of mutual trust that 
presupposes that the Dublin III Regulation is correctly applied in Iceland and establishes a pre-
sumption that Iceland’s decision to grant I.N. asylum was sound.34 
4. The ruling of the Court of Justice  
 
The ruling of the Grand Chamber mostly follows the approach of the Advocate General, but 
puts even more emphasis on the close character of the relationship between Iceland and the EU. 
The ECJ avoids any remarks that may be understood to ‘talk down’ the EEA Agreement or any 
of the other agreements that link Iceland to EU law, and strengthens even further the evidentiary 
value of an asylum decision made by the authorities of an EEA/EFTA State that participates in 
the common European asylum system.  
 
31 Para. 113, with a reference to the ECtHR’s judgment in Konkurrenten.no v. Norway, Application No 47341/15, 
in which that court, by way of an obiter dictum, opined that ‘although the EFTA Court has expressed the view that 
the provisions of the EEA Agreement “are to be interpreted in the light of fundamental rights” in order to enhance 
coherency between EEA law and EU law […], the EEA Agreement does not include the EU Charter of Funda-
mental Rights, or any reference whatsoever to other legal instruments having the same effect, such as the Conven-
tion’ (para. 43). 
32 Para. 115, with a reference to Case E-14/15, Holship, [2016] EFTA Ct. Rep., para. 123. 
33 Para. 117. 




Unlike the Advocate General, the Court of Justice also felt it pertinent to recall, by way of an 
introduction, that Articles 18 and 21 TFEU only apply to EU nationals.35 These provisions can 
thus not be the legal bases for a Petruhhin-like protection for third states’ nationals, not even 
nationals of an EEA EFTA and Schengen State like Iceland. This, however, does not mean that 
rights associated with these provisions cannot be applicable in other legal contexts, based on 
other legal instruments, such as e.g. the EEA Agreement.  
Turning to the case at hand, the ECJ stated that: 
… the Republic of Iceland has a special relationship with the European Un-
ion, which goes beyond economic and commercial cooperation. It imple-
ments and applies the Schengen acquis, as the referring court observes, but 
it is also a party to the EEA Agreement, participates in the common European 
asylum system and has concluded the Agreement on the surrender procedure 
with the European Union.36 
This special relationship framed the subsequent interpretation of the EEA Agreement, as the 
Grand Chamber confirmed that the EEA Agreement aims at “the fullest possible realisation of 
the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital within the whole EEA, so that the 
internal market established within the European Union is extended to the EFTA States” and 
that it is for the ECJ to ensure that common EU/EEA rules are interpreted uniformly.37 This led 
it to conclude, as suggested by the Advocate General, that Article 36 EEA is to be interpreted 
in line with Article 56 TEU and therefore includes the freedom for EEA nationals to go to other 
EEA States in order to receive tourist services there.38 
Even more importantly, the ECJ proceeded to let the proportionality test under Article 36 EEA 
be influenced by the other agreements between the EU and Iceland and, conversely, to let the 
interpretation of those agreements be determined by the “special relationship” of which the 
EEA Agreement is the cornerstone. Rather than distinguishing between the EEA Agreement on 
the one hand and the other agreements on the other, as suggested by the Norwegian government, 
the ECJ opted for a holistic approach where all the agreements form part of one special rela-
tionship, and where this informs the interpretation of them all – in line with their common 
objective to extend various parts of EU law to the relevant EEA EFTA State(s). 
Accordingly, by way of an introduction to the assessment of whether Petruhhin could be ap-
plied by analogy in the EEA, the ECJ found it: 
appropriate to add that not only the fact that the person concerned has the 
status as a national of an EFTA State, which is a party to the EEA Agreement, 
but also the fact that that State implements and applies the Schengen acquis, 
renders the situation of that person objectively comparable with that of an 
EU citizen to whom, in accordance with Article 3(2) TEU, the Union offers 
 
35 Judgment, paras. 40-41. 
36 Para. 44. 
37 Para. 50. 




an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which 
the free movement of persons is ensured.39 
This holistic approach informs also the assessment of the evidentiary value of the asylum deci-
sion made by Icelandic authorities in I.N.’s case. As mentioned above, the Advocate General 
opined that Croatia and Iceland are bound to an obligation of mutual trust that presupposes that 
the Dublin III Regulation is correctly applied in Iceland and establishes a presumption that 
Iceland’s decision to grant I.N. asylum was sound. The ECJ goes even further, however, when 
it states that in the absence of “significant changes” in the situation in Russia, “the existence of 
a decision of the Icelandic authorities granting [I.N] asylum must […] lead the competent au-
thority of the requested Member State, such as the referring court, to refuse extradition, pursuant 
to application of Article 19(2) of the Charter” (emphasis added).40 The ECJ thus obliges the 
Croatian Supreme Court to recognise the Icelandic decision, taking for granted that Iceland’s 
participation in the Common European Asylum puts it on the same footing as the EU Member 
States, including when it comes to mutual recognition of asylum decisions.  
The subsequent assessment of the Surrender Procedure Agreement follows the same path. Dis-
regarding the Norwegian government’s view of that agreement as a “regular international 
treaty” that cannot be interpreted in the same way as the EU Framework Decision on the Euro-
pean arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between EU Member States, the ECJ equates 
those two instruments in the assessment of the protection that the free movement rights of 
EU/EEA law offers against extradition to third States. In the ECJ’s laconic observation, the 
provisions of the Surrender Procedure Agreement are “very similar to the corresponding provi-
sions of Framework Decision”.41  
The ECJ concludes that, should the Croatian Supreme Court come to the conclusion that sig-
nificant changes in the human rights situation in Russia has opened up for extradition of I.N., 
the Petruhhin ruling is to be applied by analogy. Thus: 
when a Member State, to which a national of the Republic of Iceland has moved, receives 
an extradition request from a third State with which the first Member State has concluded 
an extradition agreement, it is in principle obliged to inform the Republic of Iceland and, 
should that State so request, surrender that national to it, in accordance with the provi-
sions of the Agreement on the surrender procedure, provided that the Republic of Iceland 
has jurisdiction, pursuant to its national law, to prosecute that person for offences com-
mitted outside its national territory.42 
 
39 Para. 58. 
40 Paras. 63-68. 
41 Para. 74. It should be added that there are certain differences between the Framework Decision and the Surrender 
Procedure Agreement, notably related to the reach of the obligation to surrender one’s own nationals, but this is 
of no relevance to the case at hand. 
42 Para. 76. If this latter condition is fulfilled in I.N.’s case may well be questioned as the alleged crime was 
committed in Russia at a time when I.N. had no connection to Iceland. At the hearing, Iceland stated ‘it might have 
jurisdiction to try I.N.’, but that this was a matter for the decision of the independent public prosecutor, see para. 






5.1 EU relations with EEA EFTA States: from bits and pieces to a more coherent whole 
 
The I.N. case makes clear just how complex the legal relationship between the EU and the EEA 
EFTA States has become. That complexity is the result of those States having sought to connect 
themselves to many aspects of the EU legal order that are not covered by the EEA Agreement 
primarily through new agreements rather than through revisions and expansion of the EEA 
scope,43 and of the EU accepting this approach. 
With a somewhat self-centred yet refreshingly critical perspective, the independent Norwegian 
EEA Review Committee of 2010-2012 thus described that phenomenon in its final report to 
government: 
The accumulation of Norway’s agreements could be described as a particu-
larly “Norwegian” form of association with the EU, similar to a patchwork 
quilt, which has gradually grown as new agreements have been added on to 
it, with no overall framework or plan. In fact, Norway’s relationship with the 
EU consists of a multiplicity of diverse agreements and provisions that are 
not formally connected, and that have evolved over time without having been 
planned, and with no clearly formulated design for what it should end up 
like.44 
As well demonstrated by the I.N. case, however, there really is no such a thing as a separate 
“Norway Model” but rather a joint Icelandic-Norwegian one: Iceland and Norway essentially 
share the same patchwork quilt. Much the same holds true for Liechtenstein, although her quilt 
does differ on some points.45 Consequently, the holistic approach which the ECJ adopted in I.N. 
is of considerable interest to all of the three EEA EFTA States, and indeed beyond.46 
As made clear by the ruling, the Court of Justice views the collection of EU-Iceland/Norway 
arrangements in a far less unconnected fashion than envisaged by the Norwegian government 
in its pleadings. Underscoring the “special” character of the relationship (French: “relations 
 
the Icelandic asylum decision rather than on analogous application of Petruhhin, the reach of Icelandic criminal 
law is unlikely to have any practical significance. 
43 As made possible by Article 118 EEA as well as the EEA contracting parties quite liberal approach to the scope 
of the Agreement’s Protocol 31 on cooperation in specific fields outside the four freedoms. For a recent example 
of the use of Protocol 31 to widen cooperation between the EU and the EEA EFTA States within the EEA frame-
work, see EEA Joint Committee Decision 269/2019 on the participation of Iceland and Norway in the EU’s efforts 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
44 Official Norwegian Reports NOU 2012:2 Outside and Inside – Norway’s agreements with the European Union 
(unofficial translation of chapter 3, December 2012). 
45 See section 5.4 below. 




privilégiées”),47 “based on proximity, long-standing common values and European identity”, 
the ECJ organises its constitutive parts in a more coherent legal whole, as a neatly knitted blan-
ket of subjective rights that covers nationals of the EFTA States concerned. 
This holistic approach is logical from an EU law point of view. Concluded by the Union, the 
various agreements with (all or any of) the EEA EFTA States constitute parts of the same, 
integrated EU legal order. As elements of EU law, 48 they all fall within the jurisdiction of the 
ECJ, particularly under Art. 267 TFEU.49 In the case at hand, the Croatian Supreme Court sub-
mitted questions on the interpretation of the EU-Iceland/Norway Schengen Association Agree-
ment, but received an answer based on a different legal instrument, namely the EEA agreement. 
To the ECJ, this was probably just an ordinary fulfilment of its general duty under the prelimi-
nary ruling procedure “to interpret all provisions of EU law which national courts require in 
order to decide the actions pending before them even if those provisions are not expressly indi-
cated in the questions referred to the Court of Justice by those courts”.50  
Approaching and organising the different agreements as a systemic legal whole is indeed criti-
cal for the effectiveness of the distinct and yet related legal sub-systems they establish, and 
ultimately of the overall “special relationship” they underpin. Akin to the EEA Agreement and 
its essential objective of extending the Single Market to the three EEA EFTA States, the 
Schengen, Dublin III, and Surrender agreements all purport to extend the application of specific, 
and yet connected pieces of EU law to the associated states.51 Although established through 
separate agreements, more recent additions like the Surrender Procedure Agreement, have pro-
gressively complemented existing arrangements partly to reflect, and to incorporate in the rela-
tionship, the substantive expansion and deepening of the EU legal order.52 The build-up of those 
additional agreements follows a functionalist logic, to which the preamble of the Agreement on 
the Surrender procedure, recalled in the judgment, alludes when mentioning that the “current 
relationships among the Contracting Parties require close cooperation in the fight against 
crime” (emphasis added). Seen in this perspective, the parts of the EU legal order that are being 
extended to e.g. Iceland and Norway, which are interwoven with other EU rules, are designed 
 
47 In the English language versions of the various agreements between the EU and the EFTA States, the relationship 
is sometimes characterized as “privileged” (e.g. in the EEA Agreement) and sometimes as “special" (e.g. in the 
Schengen Association Agreements). In French, “relations privilégiées” is consistently used, and this is reflected 
in the French version of the judgment at hand. As the ECJ opted for ‘special’ rather than ‘privileged’ in the English 
language version of the judgment, so do we in this annotation. 
48 In line with Article 216(2) TFEU. 
49 Naturally, that jurisdiction applies solely with regard to the EU; the ECJ has no jurisdiction to rule on the in-
terpretation of the Union’s agreements with the EEA EFTA States as regards their application in the latter states, 
see section 5.3 below. 
50 Paras. 43-45 of the ruling. 
51 As recalled by the Court at para 9 of the judgement, the EU-Iceland/Norway Schengen arrangements foresee 
that the Schengen acquis referred thereto is ‘accepted, implemented and applied by [the Republic of Iceland and 
the Kingdom of Norway]’. 
52 On the notion of “integration agreement”, see M Maresceau, “Les accords d’intégration dans les relations de 
proximité de l’Union européenne”, in C. Blumann (ed.), Les frontières de l’Union européenne, Brussels, Bruylant, 




to apply not only homogeneously throughout the geographical area they cover, but also coher-
ently with the rules they supplement.53  
The collection of agreements between the EU and Iceland (as well as Norway) corresponds to 
the evolution of the EU legal order itself, including its de-pillarisation.54 The substantive wid-
ening of the relationship, epitomised by the increasing number of instruments governing it, and 
its deepening as typified by the extension of mutual recognition and trust in the context of the 
Surrender Procedure Agreement,55 entail an integrated, as opposed to siloed operation of its 
sub-systems, particularly because they involve the extension of complex subjective rights, and 
require their equal protection.  
In sum, the ECJ builds upon its previous EEA-related case-law further to underscore and artic-
ulate the special character of the Union’s relationship with EEA EFTA States of which the EEA 
agreement is a critical (but not the only) part. Referring to notions of “proximity, long-standing 
common values and European identity” stated in the latter agreement, the Court embeds the 
relationship, both substantively and systemically, in a wider process of European integration 
without EU membership, which has been made more complex after the UK’s withdrawal from 
the Union. The ruling indeed contributes to fleshing out the distinct category of relationship the 
pouvoir constituant alluded to in drafting Article 8 TEU, which mandates the EU to develop 
“special relations with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and 
good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterized by close and peace-
ful relations based on cooperation”.56  
 
53 Further on this, see C. Hillion, “Integrating an Outsider: An EU Perspective on Relations with Norway” (2011) 
16 European Foreign Affairs Reviews, pp. 489–520; and “Norway and the changing Common Foreign and Security 
Policy of the European Union”, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, NUPI Report 1, 2019.  
54 It should indeed be recalled that the Schengen Agreement with Norway and Iceland was one of the very few 
“cross-pillar” agreements concluded by the Community and the EU. Further, see R A Wessel, “Cross-Pillar Mix-
ity: Combining Competences in the Conclusion of the EU International Agreements” in C. Hillion & P. Koutrakos 
(Eds.), Mixed Agreements in EU Law Revisited, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010, pp. 30-54. 
55 The apparent linguistic distinction between mutual trust and mutual confidence (see para 59) is not as potent an 
argument as it may seem. The respective preambles of the EAW and of the Surrender Procedure Agreement refer 
both to the notion of “confidence”. It should also be recalled that “mutual trust” and “mutual confidence” are both 
translated as “confiance mutuelle” in French language version of EU documents. It is thus the notion of “confiance 
mutuelle” that is referred to both in the Preamble of the Surrender Procedure Agreement with Norway and Iceland 
and in, e.g., Opinion 2/13 on the draft accession agreement to the ECHR, which is often cited as an authority on 
the significance of the principle of mutual trust within the EU. This suggests that the principle of “mutual trust” as 
it has “come to evolve in the European Union”, has at least some application in the special relationship between 
the EU and the EEA EFTA states, of which the EEA Agreement is a cornerstone (cp. AG Opinion at para 97). The 
view that the principle of mutual trust does not apply to third states (as per para 129 of Opinion 1/17 CETA, 
EU:C:2019:341) should indeed be nuanced. In this connection, see the Opinion of AG Kokott in C-488/19 Minister 
of Justice and Equality v J.R., EU:C:2020:738. 
56 Further on this provision, see e.g. C. Hillion, “Anatomy of EU norms export towards the neighbourhood – the 
impact of Article 8 TEU” in P. van Elsuwege and R. Petrov (eds.) Legislative Approximation and Application of 
EU Law in the Eastern Neighbourhood of the European Union - Towards a Common Regulatory Space? (London: 




Importantly, and notwithstanding the Norwegian government’s attempt to argue otherwise, the 
Court’s ‘EU-like’ approach to the various agreements appears to be fully in line with their for-
mal character as international treaties. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties57, which express, to this effect, general customary international law, state that a treaty is to 
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose (emphasis added). The object and purpose 
of not only the EEA Agreement, but also of the other agreements that associate the EEA EFTA 
States to various parts of EU law, are just that, namely to extend those parts of EU law, as 
interpreted by the ECJ, to those States.58  
Consequently, the ‘gravitational pull’ of the homogeneity objective of the EEA Agreement is 
now so strong that if the EEA EFTA States really want any future agreement with the EU to 
reproduce only the wording, not the content, of a given part of EU law, they will have to say so 
explicitly (why the EU would want to enter into such an agreement is another matter). 59 With-
out any such explicit reservation, the EEA EFTA States must be prepared for the ECJ to develop 
also their obligations in ways that they might not have foreseen and might not always like – as 
demonstrated well by the Norwegian government’s futile attempt in I.N. to avoid the “transfer” 
of Petruhhin to the EEA.60 The fact that more or less ground-breaking developments of ECJ 
case-law will often be rooted in an over-arching objective of European integration to which the 
EEA EFTA States have not formally subscribed, does not hinder that case-law being transferred 
to the various agreements linking the EEA EFTA States to EU law. Put simply, acceptance of 
such developments is effectively part of their “special relationship” with the EU.      
This approach is also warranted by reasons of legal certainty. The higher the number of excep-
tions in, and between the agreements that link the EEA EFTA States to EU law, the harder it 
will be to make the various agreements work in practice. The experts in the governments of the 
EEA EFTA States may perhaps feel able to handle a high number of detailed and fine-tuned 
exceptions, but for everybody else this will be different. Unsurprisingly, awareness of the pe-
culiarities of EEA law may not be as high in the EU-pillar of the EEA as the three small EEA 
EFTA States would want it to be, and this is equally true for their other agreements with the 
EU. What the judgment in I.N. confirms, is that the ECJ approaches these agreements on the 
presumption that they indeed do extend the application of EU law to the relevant EEA EFTA 
States, so that the burden of proof lies with anyone arguing for a different solution in any given 
case. For the continued success of the EEA, this ‘default’ is important. It allows for EU-insti-
tutions, EU member states, EU companies and EU citizens to trust that the law is essentially 
the same throughout the EEA, thus fostering legal certainty and limiting administrative and 
 
57 Of 23 May 1969, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331. 
58 See, e.g., Mads Andenæs, “Sovereignty”, in: Baudenbacher (ed.), The Fundamental Principles of EEA Law, 
Springer 2017, 91-108, at p. 96-97, arguing that the Vienna Convention’s emphasis on the object and purpose of 
a treaty allows for homogeneity between EU and EEA law even if the starting point for the interpretation of the 
EEA Agreement was to be taken in Article 31 VC.     
59 On other expressions of this gravitational pull and related challenges, see T. Bekkedal, “Third State participation 
in EU agencies: Exploring the EEA precedent”, (2019) 56 CMLRev. 381 – 416. 




other transactional costs considerably. This is not to suggest that there are no remaining differ-
ences between EU and EEA law, nor that any such differences are unjustified and ought to be 
eliminated by way of teleological interpretation. There might well be cases where the EEA 
EFTA States and the EU agree to deviate from the template provided by EU law, but after I.N. 
they need to make sure to do so explicitly. 
 
5.2 A situation ‘objectively comparable’ to EU citizenship: the new status of EEA-Schengen 
States' nationals? 
 
Notwithstanding the importance of the judgment for the relationship between the EEA EFTA 
States and the EU, it may prove to be even more meaningful for the status of nationals of these 
states in EU law and, conversely, of EU citizens in the latter states. The essence of the Grand 
Chamber judgment may indeed be that the ECJ is prepared to consider not only the EEA EFTA 
States but also (and perhaps even primarily) their citizens as ‘insiders’ rather than ‘outsiders’. 
The basis for this contention is the Court’s view that the situation of Icelandic nationals is “ob-
jectively comparable with that of an EU citizen to whom, in accordance with Article 3(2) TEU, 
the Union offers an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the 
free movement of persons is ensured”.61 The statement, which is reiterated in the concluding 
paragraph of the ruling,62 is remarkable because it establishes an explicit connection between 
EEA EFTA nationals and EU citizens for the purpose of free movement. The statement is also 
intriguing because its function in resolving the case is not obvious. 
Having identified Article 36 EEA as the relevant provision to address the Croatian Supreme 
Court’s query, the ECJ could arguably have confined itself to note that that provision is to be 
interpreted in line with Article 56 TFEU and thus protects all EEA nationals from being hin-
dered whilst exercising their right to travel to another EEA State in order to receive services 
there, in application of the Cowan case law.63 This would have been more in line with the ap-
proach of the Advocate General, whose only reference to Article 3(2) TEU was a short nod to 
the Norwegian government’s view that this provision has no counterpart in the EEA Agree-
ment.64 
The “objectively comparable” pronouncement is all the more perplexing as the Court derives it 
from a combination of the Schengen Association and the EEA Agreement. As with the parallel 
drawn to the EU’s area of freedom, security and justice, it is not clear that invoking the 
 
61 Para. 58 of the judgment. 
62 Para. 75 of the judgment. 
63 Referring to the Cowan ruling, the Court recalled that “freedom to provide services, within the meaning of 
Article 56 TFEU, includes the freedom for the recipients of services to go to another Member State in order to 
receive a service there, without being obstructed by restrictions, and that tourists must be regarded as recipients of 
services”, and then considered in I.N. that ”that same interpretation must be given as regards the freedom to provide 
services guaranteed in Article 36 of the EEA Agreement”, see paras 52 and 53 of the judgment. 




Schengen Association Agreement was necessary in order to solve the case. It is indeed striking 
that there are no further references to it later in the judgment. Having concluded that extradition 
may be justified in view of the objective of fighting impunity, the overall assessment of pro-
portionality focuses on whether the surrender agreement could provide a more appropriate 
means to achieve the proposed objective.65 
One possible interpretation of the Court’s reference to Iceland’s application of the Schengen 
acquis, and the derived parallel to the EU’s area of freedom, security and justice, is that it was 
considered necessary to compensate for the fact that there is no provision in the EEA Agreement 
mirroring Article 21 TFEU. The latter provision was after all the legal basis applied in Petruh-
hin, a fact that was indeed central to the Norwegian government’s opposition to a “transfer” of 
the ruling to the EEA setting. In his Opinion, the Advocate General had also voiced scepticism 
towards the EEA-relevance of the case-law “elaborated by the Court exclusively based on Ar-
ticle 21 TFEU”66, while the Court itself stated in a preliminary point that that provision “does 
not apply to a national of a third State”.67 Rather than wading right into the controversial debate 
in the EFTA-pillar of the EEA on whether the lack of an EEA-parallel to Article 21 TFEU can 
be compensated for by a dynamic interpretation of the Citizenship Directive,68 the ECJ seem-
ingly found a way around the problem by mentioning Iceland’s application of  Schengen rules. 
By combining Iceland’s association to the single market (through the EEA Agreement) and to 
the Schengen acquis, the Grand Chamber was able to consider the free movement rights of I.N. 
to be objectively comparable to the free movement rights of EU citizens in the Union’s area of 
freedom, security and justice, thus permitting the application by analogy of the citizenship-
based Petruhhin ruling to I.N.  
On that interpretation, I.N. would not have benefited from the application of the Petruhhin case 
law had Iceland as an EEA EFTA state not also applied the Schengen acquis because then his 
situation would not have been comparable to that of an EU citizen. The EEA agreement alone 
would not have sufficed to allow that application by analogy, based on the notion that the ab-
sence of the concept of EU citizenship in EEA law potentially entail more limited free move-
ment rights compared to those enjoyed by EU citizens, and thus a more limited protection. 
Equal treatment between EEA EFTA nationals and EU citizens as far as free movement is con-
cerned thus hinges on a gap-filling legal instrument to perform the same role as the one seem-
ingly played by Schengen in the case at hand, for the ECJ citizenship-based case law concerning 
free movement to be extended to the EEA context.  
 
65 Paras. 69 ff. of the judgment. 
66 Para. 91 of the Opinion. 
67 Para. 41 of the judgment. 
68 At the time of the ECJ’s deliberations in I.N., the EFTA Court was confronted with a request for an advisory 
opinion from the Supreme Court of Norway which essentially asked for reconsideration of the interpretation of 
the Citizenship Directive established in Case E-28/15 Jabbi. The Norwegian government made sure to inform the 
ECJ of this pending case, and essentially invited the Grand Chamber to pre-empt the EFTA Court’s decision by 
ruling that rights based solely on Article 21 TFEU fall outside of the scope of the EEA Agreement, see para. 56 of 
the AG Opinion. As the ECJ tacitly declined to do so, the EFTA Court could later stand its ground, cf. the Advisory 




Looking at the other parts of the I.N ruling, however, another interpretation is also possible. 
The combined reference to Schengen and the EEA could be viewed as establishing no less than 
a new status for the nationals of Iceland (and Norway) in EU law.   
As alluded to earlier, neither the “objectively comparable” element, nor Iceland’s application 
of the Schengen acquis seems to have had any operational role in the ECJ’s reasoning leading 
to analogous application of Petruhhin. Arguably, the absence of citizenship in the EEA did not 
have to be compensated for as it was simply irrelevant in deciding on the case; the solution 
being based on an application of classic free movement approach under the EEA Agreement 
(as indeed suggested by the Advocate General).69  
An alternative interpretation of the Court’s reference to Iceland’s association to the Schengen 
area could then be that the ECJ is taking advantage of the opportunity offered by the Croatian 
Supreme Court’s question to cast some light on the Schengen Agreement’s enrichment of the 
EEA-based free movement rights of Icelanders (and by extension Norwegians).  
On this interpretation, the Schengen acquis deepens the freedom of movement already enjoyed 
by Icelanders (and Norwegians) under the EEA agreement, and enhances their status by making 
their “situation …objectively comparable to that of EU citizens”. Iceland’s nationals not only 
enjoy the extensive market-based freedom of movement derived from the EEA, but also a 
Schengen based freedom to move, like EU citizens, within the AFSJ, an area without internal 
borders.  
Such an articulation of a new status for those nationals within the EU legal order, based on the 
Schengen agreement as another constitutive element of the special relationship, partly recalls 
what the ECJ did in Grzelczyk,70 following the introduction of Union Citizenship in EU primary 
law. The Court famously referred to the then new Treaty provisions to coin the notion that 
“Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States”, 
a new status going beyond the one hitherto developed in the context of the single market, and 
becoming a basis for the development of further and deeper rights.   
I.N. could thus be seen as a Grzelczyk moment for nationals of the EEA EFTA states in terms 
of their position under EU law: not in the sense that the Court is extending citizenship to 
nationals of EEA-Schengen states, but in the sense that it endows them with a richer status than 
the one hitherto assumed in EEA law alone, and with it a factor of dynamism in the articulation 
of their rights under EU law. The special relationship between the EU and the EEA-Schengen 
states establishes a citizen-like status for nationals of those countries within the EU legal order 
(as far as free movement is concerned, not political rights). 
 
69 Arguably, Article 21 TFEU in Petruhhin serves to trigger a classic free movement analysis; the justifica-
tion/proportionality analysis of the restriction at hand could have equally been conducted on the basis of the 
TFEU provisions on services. 
70 Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk, EU:C:2001:458. Further on the significance of this case see e.g. N. Nic Shuibhne, 
“The Developing Legal Dimensions of Union Citizenship”, in Arnull and Chalmers (eds), The Oxford Handbook 
of European Union Law (OUP, 2015), pp. 477-507, M. Dougan, “The constitutional dimension to the caselaw on 





5.3 It takes two for a relationship to be special: the consequences of I.N. in the EFTA-pillar 
of the EEA 
 
According to the two-pillar structure of the EEA, the ECJ has no jurisdiction in the EFTA-pillar 
of the EEA.71 Thus, the judgment in I.N. does not bind the EEA EFTA States. Nevertheless, 
under Article 3(2) of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Sur-
veillance Authority and a Court of Justice (SCA), the EFTA Court shall pay “due account” to 
the principles laid down by the relevant rulings of the ECJ, and the judgment in I.N. falls 
squarely within that category.72 Based on more than 25 years of experience with the workings 
of the EEA, it may safely be held that the EFTA Court will do its utmost to follow the interpre-
tation of Article 36 EEA laid down in I.N. The understanding and tacit acceptance of this is the 
very reason why the Norwegian government and the EFTA Surveillance Authority exercised 
their right to take part in the proceedings before the ECJ in I.N.   
At first sight, the ECJ’s holistic approach to the patchwork of agreements between the EU and 
the EEA EFTA States may cause difficulties for the EFTA Court. Despite its name, the EFTA 
Court’s jurisdiction is limited to the EFTA-pillar of the EEA Agreement – it has no jurisdiction 
over the EEA EFTA States application of any of their other agreements with the EU. It is there-
fore far from straight-forward for the EFTA Court to rely on the Schengen Association Agree-
ment in its approach to the EEA Agreement, in the way the ECJ appears to have done in I.N. 
However, as far as the interpretation of Article 36 EEA is concerned, the situation is essentially 
the same as in cases where the Court of Justice develops its understanding of EEA-relevant EU 
law in light of provisions of EU law that are not part of the EEA Agreement. As mentioned in 
above,73 it has long been recognised that the EEA Agreement’s objective of extending the EU 
internal market to the EEA EFTA States can only be achieved if the interpretation of the corre-
sponding provisions of the EEA Agreement keeps pace with such developments of EU law.    
The situation is more complicated, however, if the ECJ indeed is about to develop a general 
right of free movement for all EEA nationals, based on a combined reading of the EEA Agree-
ment and the Schengen Association Agreement.74 If the EEA EFTA States’ association to the 
Schengen area is to be considered an indispensable part of the legal basis for such a right, the 
EFTA Court will not be able to simply adopt the ECJ’s reasoning. It can take the Schengen 
Association Agreement into account as part of the context when interpreting the EEA Agree-
ment, but it cannot derive rights and obligations from an agreement over which it has no juris-
diction. This does not suggest, however, that the EFTA Court will not be able to reach the same 
 
71 As noted by the Court in Case C-321/97, Andersson, EU:C:1999:307, paras. 28-29. 
72 In most cases, the ECJ case-law applied by the EFTA Court concern interpretation of the TFEU and/or secondary 
EU legislation, requiring the EFTA Court to consider its EEA-relevance. This is different in the case at hand, as 
the ECJ dealt directly with the interpretation of the EEA Agreement. That also such rulings are covered by the 
EFTA Court’s obligation to pay due account to ECJ case-law, follows directly from the wording of Article 3(2) 
SCA.   
73 Section 5.1. 




outcome as the ECJ. Indeed, in its recent Advisory Opinion in Campbell, the EFTA Court par-
aphrased the Court of Justice’s case-law to the effect that the freedom of movement for workers, 
as enshrined in Article 28 EEA, is (only) “a specific expression of the general right to move 
and reside freely within the EEA”.75 The opinion says nothing about the legal basis for this 
general right to free movement, which in the context of EU law of course is to be found in 
Articles 20 and 21 TFEU. However, based on the EFTA Court’s approach in other cases, the 
Court seems poised to reveal a general, unwritten EEA law principle of free movement, deduced 
from the various provisions in the Main Part of the Agreement on the free movement of work-
ers, self-employed and service providers and recipients, the many EU legal acts in the annexes 
concerning free movement of other categories of people, an EEA-specific reading of the Citi-
zenship Directive and, more generally, the stated purposes and the legal structure of the EEA 
Agreement.76 Despite its apparent reliance upon the Schengen Association Agreement, the 
ECJ’s judgment in I.N. certainly bolsters the EFTA Court’s stand in Campbell.77           
Less complicated for the EFTA Court is the ECJ’s reliance in I.N. on the Surrender Procedure 
Agreement in the proportionality test under Article 36 EEA. It is settled law that the propor-
tionality test has to take into account the legal context in which e.g. the freedom to provide or 
receive services operates. Relevant international agreements will form part of that context, as 
confirmed by both the ECJ and the EFTA Court in several cases.78   
The legal basis in the EFTA-pillar of the EEA to solve a case like that of I.N. would also differ 
as to the protection against extradition to a third country where an EEA national would risk 
exposure to inhuman or degrading treatment. The ECJ’s reliance upon Article 19(2) of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights will not be available to the EFTA Court for the simple fact that 
the Charter has not been incorporated into the EEA Agreement or in any other way formally 
recognised by the EEA EFTA States. The ECJ did not dwell on this in I.N. since Article 19(2) 
CFR applies to everyone, i.e. also nationals of the EEA EFTA States, as soon as their situation 
falls within the scope of application of EU law.79 As noted by the Advocate General, however, 
the EFTA Court has long recognised fundamental rights as unwritten general principles of EEA 
 
75 Case E-4/19, Campbell, para. 58. See further C. Franklin and H.H. Fredriksen, “Differentiated Citizenship in 
the European Economic Area”, in: Kosta and Thym (ed.), Research Handbook on EU Citizenship (forthcoming). 
76 The latter is the phrase used in Sveinbjörnsdóttir, where the EFTA Court deduced an unwritten principle of State 
liability from the purposes and structure of the EEA Agreement (Case E-9/97, para. 47). 
77 It may be added that the EFTA Court’s approach has the advantage of not being dependent upon the involved 
EEA States being associated to the Schengen area, thus avoiding the complications the ECJ’s approach might have 
been faced with if I.N. had been on holiday in Ireland rather than Croatia.   
78 An EEA-relevant example from the ECJ is Case C-48/11, A, EU:C:2012:485, para. 37 (bilateral agreement on 
mutual administrative assistance in the field of taxation). A converse example from the EFTA Court is Case E-
5/10, Kottke, para. 51, where the proportionality test had to take into account the fact that Liechtenstein is not a 
party to the Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters.  
79 As was the case for I.N. (as recalled by the Court in paras 54 and 63 of the ruling) thus requiring that the Croa-
tian authorities apply the Charter, in line with Article 51(1) CFR (whereby the Charter applies to “the institu-
tions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union … and to the Member States only when they are implementing 




law, based in particular on the fact that all of the EEA States are parties to the ECHR.80 Thus, 
as the protection offered by Article 19(2) CFR essentially corresponds to that offered by Article 
3 ECHR, the EFTA Court would probably be able to follow also this part of I.N., despite the 
fact that the Dublin III Regulation is outside its jurisdiction. 
In spite of all this, however, there are tensions between the ECJ’s holistic approach to the patch-
work of agreements between the EU and the EEA EFTA States on the one hand, and the fact 
that the jurisdiction of the EFTA Court is limited to the EEA Agreement on the other. The EEA 
EFTA States will probably reply that this is all quite unproblematic as their own national courts 
do have jurisdiction over the whole patchwork, guaranteeing EU nationals in the EEA EFTA 
States essentially the same level of protection as the ECJ offers to EEA EFTA nationals in the 
EU.81 The future of the special relationship between the EU and EEA EFTA States hinges on 
the EU’s trust in this set-up.   
 
5.4 The reach of Court’s integrated approach: What does it take for a relationship to be 
“special”?  
 
The “special relationship” that the Court sees between Iceland and the EU is clearly extendable 
to Norway, given the fact that Norway is a party to all of the agreements relied upon in I.N. to 
justify this characterization. However, already for the third of the three EEA EFTA States, 
Liechtenstein, the assessment is a bit more complicated. The country is not a party to the Sur-
render Procedure Agreement that proved to be decisive in I.N. Still, as a Schengen Associated 
State, it is bound by the 1996 Extradition Convention, which at long last entered into force in 
2019. Whether this is sufficient to extend the ruling in I.N. to a Liechtenstein citizen in a similar 
situation, particularly in light of Liechtenstein’s reservations to the Convention82, remains to be 
seen. Given the centrality of the EEA agreement in the ecosystem of the EU-Iceland relation-
ship in the Court’s reasoning in I.N., it is arguable that the “special relationship” should be 
extended to Liechtenstein as well, but that there may nevertheless be cases where differences 
between the 1996 Schengen Extradition Convention and the Surrender Procedure Agreement 
renders it difficult to attain the EEA Agreement’s objective of not only homogeneous interpre-
tation, but also homogeneous application of EU and EEA law throughout the EEA.83 
 
80 Para. 115, with a reference to Case E-14/15, Holship, [2016] EFTA Ct. Rep., para. 123. See further R. Spano, 
“The EFTA Court and Fundamental Rights”, 13 European Constitutional Law Review (2017), pp. 475-492. 
81 See in this respect the Order issued by the Supreme Court's Appeals Selection Committee of 13 March 2020, 
HR-2020-553-U, addressing the question of whether extradition of a Polish citizen to Poland would violate Article 
6 ECHR:  
82 Supra, fn. 6. Liechtenstein has notified the following declaration: 'In accordance with Article 6(3) of the EU 
Convention on Extradition, the Principality of Liechtenstein declares that it will grant extradition in connection 
with a fiscal offence only for acts or omissions which may constitute an offence in connection with excise, value-
added tax or customs.' 
83 Along the lines of the judgment in Case C‑72/09, Établissements Rimbaud, EU:C:2010:645, where the lack of 




More complicated still is the assessment of the EU’s relationship to the fourth EFTA State, viz. 
Switzerland. A key question will be just how important the EEA Agreement is to the “special 
relationship” which the ECJ sees between the EU and Iceland. Is the Switzerland-EU agreement 
on free movement of persons, which does give Swiss citizens the right to travel to EU Member 
States in order to receive services there,84 combined with Switzerland’s participation in the 
Common European Asylum System and the Schengen Association Agreement (including the 
abovementioned 1996 Extradition Convention), sufficient to guarantee a Swiss citizen in a sim-
ilar situation the protection against extradition that the ECJ granted to I.N.?  
The case-law on the various agreements between the EU and Switzerland provides no clear 
answer. On the one hand, in the series of UK v. Council (social security) cases of 2013-2014, 
the Court of Justice took a common approach for the EEA and the EU-Switzerland arrangement, 
which contrasted with the one taken towards the Ankara agreement.85 On the other hand, in 
Grimme the ECJ emphasized that Switzerland, by its refusal to join the EEA, “did not subscribe 
to the project of an economically integrated entity with a single market, based on common rules 
between its members, but chose the route of bilateral arrangements between the Community 
and its Member States in specific areas.”86 This was followed up, e.g., in Hengartner and Gas-
ser and Picard, where the ECJ interpreted provisions of the EU-Switzerland agreement on the 
free movement of persons differently from the EU rules applicable to similar situations (free-
dom to provide services and freedom of establishment), thus refusing to extend to Switzerland 
the approach taken in relation to the EEA EFTA States.87  
Although less “special” than the EU - EEA EFTA States relationship, will the EU-Switzerland 
arrangements be considered special enough to warrant the extension of I.N. also to Swiss na-
tionals? And if not, will the institutional set up envisaged by the still unsigned EU-Switzerland 
Framework Agreement make a difference in this regard?88 Future case-law will hopefully clar-
ify whether the I.N. approach can indeed be extended to other EU relations with other European 
states, i.e. non-EEA / non-EFTA, and their nationals, and if so under what conditions. To be 
sure, extending the “special” treatment to looser relationships, involving less constraints and 
responsibilities for the EU partners in terms of homogeneity requirements, might risk under-
mining the sustainability of integrated systems like the EEA and Schengen association.  
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